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Abstract. Within social choice theory, the new ﬁeld of judgment aggregation aims
to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions
into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Commonly, judgment
aggregation is studied using standard propositional logic, with a limited expressive
power and a problematic representation of conditional statements (“if P then Q”) as
material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a generalised model, in
which most realistic decision problems can be represented. The model is not restricted
to a particular logic but is open to several logics, including standard propositional
logic, predicate calculi, modal logics and conditional logics. To illustrate the model,
I prove an impossibility theorem, which generalises earlier results.
Key words: judgment aggregation, discursive dilemma, modelling methodology, formal
logics, impossibility theorem
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D70, D71, D79
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The traditional model of social choice theory, preference aggregation,d e ﬁnes a collect-
ive decision problem as the problem of forming collective preferences over a given set
of alternatives (actions, policies, candidates, states of society etc.). By contrast, the
newly arising model of judgment aggregation deﬁnes a collective decision problem as
the problem of forming collective judgments (acceptance or rejection) on a given set
of logically interrelated propositions. As a simple example, suppose the population
of a country disagrees on whether the following propositions hold:
a : The birth rate is too low to guarantee long-term economic stability.
b : More immigration is needed.
a → b : If the birth rate is too low to guarantee long-term economic stability,
then more immigration is needed.
Reaching collective judgments on logically interrelated propositions is non-trivial.
Suppose that in the example the population is split into three camps of equal size. As
a a → b b
1/3 of the population True True True
1/3 of the population True False False
1/3 of the population False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A discursive dilemmashown in Table 1, each camp holds a logically consistent set of judgments; for instance
the ﬁrst camp accepts a and a → b, and accordingly accepts b. Yet the propositionwise
majority judgments are logically inconsistent: a and a → b are accepted, but b is
rejected. Such situations are known as discursive dilemmas (e.g. Pettit 2001).
How can the group reach consistent decisions? Two aggregation rules have re-
ceived particular attention; let me deﬁne them for our example. Under the premise-
based procedure, the group takes majority votes only on a and a → b (the premises)
and decides b (the conclusion) by logical entailment from the decisions on a and
a → b.S o , i n T a b l e 1 , a and a → b are accepted, and hence b is accepted. Under
the conclusion-based procedure, the group takes a majority vote only on b and ignores
the majority verdicts on a and a → b.S o ,i nT a b l e1 ,b is rejected and no collective
judgment is made on a and a → b.
The propositions in judgment aggregation can be atomic (such as a or b)o rc o m -
pound (such as a → b), and they can express for instance beliefs (e.g. “pollution
creates global warming”), desires (e.g. “global warming is undesirable”) or act pref-
erences (e.g. “measure X against pollution should be taken”). The judgment aggreg-
ation model is close to real decision situations. First, individuals are not required
to rank many complex alternatives, but only to have opinions on diﬀerent issues.
Second, real decision situations often take indeed the form of accepting or rejecting
diﬀerent propositions, which are interconnected.
In this paper, I argue that judgment aggregation allows one to study a wide range
of realistic collective decision problems. However, to do so the model should be ex-
tended beyond standard propositional logic. While standard propositional logic can
adequately represent decision problems whose propositions involve only the logical
operators “and”, “or” and “not”, many real problems do not have this form and
require more expressive logics. Problems involving conditional statements, such as
a → b above, usually require a conditional logic, although they were so far represented
in standard propositional logic by using the (problematic) material conditional, as
explained later. Other realistic decision problems may be represented in a predicate
logic, in which atomic propositions are not taken as primitives but are constructed
from constants, variables, functions and relations (just as in common language sen-
tences are not primitives). This allows for instance to embed preference aggregation
into judgment aggregation. Many decision problems can be represented using modal
logics, in which one can express propositional attitudes such as “it is desirable that
p”, “it is ethically required/allowed that p”, “it is probable that p” etc.
The good news is that a uniﬁed model of judgment aggregation is still possible,
despite of the diﬀerences between the logics necessary for the various applications. I
introduce a model in “general logics” that is not restricted to any speciﬁc logic but
contains most practically relevant logics as special cases. Several previous results, if
suitably restated, can be shown to hold in general logics; many others are yet to be
derived.
In Section 2, I introduce the model, which is based on a set of mild conditions on
the logic. In Section 3, I illustrate the model by discussing several types of collective
decision problems, all of which can be represented within the model. In Section 4,I
prove an impossibility theorem, which generalises earlier results to general logics. In
Section 5, I provide a list of simple tools that can be used to prove results in general
logics; these tools underlie many existing proofs in judgment aggregation, which shows
2that one can conveniently work in general logics. In Section 6,Im e n t i o nt h a ti tc a n
also be interesting to derive results restricted to a particular logic — though often not
standard propositional logic —, which leads me to contrast judgment aggregation in
general logics with judgment aggregation in a speciﬁc logic. In Section 7,Is u m m a r i s e
and conclude the paper.
On a less formal basis, judgment aggregation has been discussed already for a
while, partly focussing on the distinction between premise-based and conclusion-based
decision-making (e.g. Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 2004, Chapman 1998, 2002, Pettit
2001, Bovens and Rabinowicz 2004). List and Pettit (2002) formalise judgment ag-
gregation using standard propositional logic, and prove a ﬁrst social-choice-theoretic
impossibility result. This sparked a series of contributions. Pauly and van Hees
(2004), Dietrich (2004), Gärdenfors (2004), Nehring and Puppe (2004) and van Hees
(2004) prove several impossibility theorems, whose main message is that, given certain
logical connections between the propositions under decision, propositionwise aggreg-
ation (satisfying some mild conditions) is impossible. To escape impossibilities, one
may for instance restrict the domain of the aggregation rule (List 2003), restrict the
independence condition to premises (Dietrich 2004), use fusion operators (Pigozzi
2004), or use sequential decision rules (List 2004b and Dietrich and List 2005). The
models of Pauly and van Hees (2004) and van Hees (2004) allow for degrees of accept-
ance,as i g n i ﬁcant generalisation of the informational input and output of decision
procedures, but still with the same limited expressive power of propositions as in
the standard model. The probability of “correct” collective judgments is analysed
by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2004) and List (2004a). Gärdenfors (2004) and Gekker
(2003) question the requirement that judgments must be complete. Strategy-proof
judgment aggregation is analysed in Dietrich and List (2004). Characterisations of
the class of aggregation rules satisfying various collective rationality conditions (and
other conditions) are provided in Nehring and Puppe (2004), Dietrich and List (2005)
and Nehring (2005). List and Pettit (2004) discuss the connection to preference ag-
gregation.
2 A judgment aggregation model in general logics
2.1 General logics
In its most general form, a logic (with negation operator ¬)i sap a i r(L,|=) consisting
of:
• some non-empty set L of formal expressions1, such that p ∈ L implies ¬p ∈ L;
L is the language, its elements are the propositions;
• some binary relation |= (⊆ P(L) × L) between sets A ⊆ L and propositions
p ∈ L; |= is the entailment relation,a n dA |= p is read A (logically) entails p,o rp is
a (logical) consequence of A;Iw r i t ep1,...,p k |= p for {p1,...,p k}| = p.
The language L tells what sentences can be formed, a purely syntactic notion.
T h ee n t a i l m e n tr e l a t i o n|= tells how the propositions are interrelated, a semantic
notion. The other important semantic notion, (in)consistency, can be deﬁned out of
entailment.
1A formal expression is simply a concatenation of symbols.
3Deﬁnition 1 As e tA ⊆ L is inconsistent if there is a p ∈ L such that A |= p and
A |= ¬p, and consistent otherwise.2
This abstract notion of a logic is very ﬂexible, as examples will illustrate. All
basic notions of judgment aggregation can be deﬁned for a general logic (L,|=) in the
familiar way: agendas, judgment sets, rationality conditions (e.g. deductive closure),
aggregation rules, and conditions on aggregation rules (anonymity, independence,
etc.). To obtain interesting results such as (im)possibility theorems, some condi-
tions on the logic (L,|=) a r eo fc o u r s ei n e v i t a b l e .T h eg o o dn e w si st h a tt h r e em i l d
conditions are often suﬃcient (and necessary):
L1: For any p ∈ L, p |= p (self-entailment).
L2: For any p ∈ L and A,B ⊆ L,i fA |= p and A ⊆ B then B |= p (monotonicity).
L3: The empty set ∅ is consistent, and each consistent set A ⊆ L has a consistent
superset B ⊆ L containing a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ L (completability).
By L1-L3, any proposition entails itself, any entailment A |= p is preserved by
adding new premises, and consistent sets can be extended to complete consistent sets.
Most realistic judgment aggregation problems can be formalised in logics of type
L1-L3 (see Section 2). While many arguments commonly used in proofs work perfectly
for a general logic (L,|=) of type L1-L3, some arguments require additional properties,
which are also satisﬁed by the logics of most realistic aggregation problems:
L4: For any A ⊆ L and p ∈ L,i fA ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent then A |= p (non-
paraconsistency).
L5: For any p ∈ L and A ⊆ L,i fA |= p there B |= p for some ﬁnite subset B ⊆ A
(compactness).
In summary, the conditions L1-L3 (plus perhaps L4,L5) are suﬃciently weak for
representing many real-world aggregation problems, and suﬃciently strong for de-
riving many interesting results; they are therefore a possible framework to study
judgment aggregation in general logics. All this is argued more carefully later.
2.2 The basic notions of judgment aggregation
In o wd e ﬁne the familiar notions of judgment aggregation for a general logic (L,|=)
of type L1-L3 (and perhaps L4 and L5). Consider a group of n individuals denoted
1,...,n(n ≥ 2), having to make collective judgments on interrelated propositions.
The agenda.T h eagenda (containing the propositions to be decided) is any non-
empty set X ⊆ L that (i) contains no double-negated propositions (¬¬p)a n d( i i )i s
the union of proposition-negation pairs {p,¬p}. The starting example has the agenda
X = {a,¬a,a → b,¬(a → b),b,¬b},w h e r e→ should be a subjunctive conditional and
(L,|=) a conditional logic, as explained later.
Judgment sets.Ajudgment set (held by an individual or the collective) is a subset
A ⊆ X,w h e r ep ∈ A means “p is accepted”. A judgment set A is
2Ap r o p o s i t i o n sp ∈ L is inconsistent (or a contradiction)i f{p} is inconsistent, consistent if {p}
is consistent, a tautology if {¬p} is inconsistent, and contingent if {p} and {¬p} are consistent.
4• complete if it contains at least one member of each pair p,¬p ∈ X;
• weakly consistent if it contains at most one member of each pair p,¬p ∈ X;
• consistent if (see Deﬁnition 1) there is no p ∈ L with A |= p and A |= ¬p;
• deductively closed if, for each p ∈ X,i fA |= p then p ∈ A;3
• fully rational if A satisﬁes completeness and consistency (and so all other ra-
tionality conditions by Proposition 1).
For instance, for the above example agenda X, the judgment set A = ∅ is con-
sistent and deductively closed but incomplete, the judgment set A = {a,a → b,¬b}
is complete but only weakly consistent and not deductively closed, and the judgment
set A = {a,¬(a → b),b} is fully rational (since → is a subjunctive conditional, as
deﬁned below).
The various rationality conditions are interrelated as follows:
Proposition 1 Let L1-L3 hold. For any judgment set A ⊆ X,
(a) consistency implies weak consistency, and both are equivalent given deductive
closure and L4;
(b) full rationality implies the conjunction of completeness, weak consistency and
deductive closure, and both are equivalent given L4.
Proof. The proof uses tools derived in Section 5 and hence is given there. ¥
Aggregation rules.A proﬁle is an n-tuple (A1,...,A n) of (individual) judgment
sets. A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F assigning to each proﬁle (A1,...,A n)
in a given set of admissible proﬁles a (collective) judgment set F(A1,...,A n)=A.T h e
set of admissible proﬁles is called the domain of F, written Domain(F).A l lc o m m o n
requirements on aggregation rules (anonymity, universal domain, etc.) can easily be
stated in our general framework, as they do not appeal to any particular logic. For
instance:
Universal Domain. The domain of F, Domain(F), is the set of all proﬁles (A1,...,A n)
of fully rational judgment sets.
Collective Rationality. T h ec o l l e c t i v ej u d g m e n ts e tF(A1,...,A n) is fully rational
for every proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F).
Independence. For any proposition p ∈ X and proﬁles (A1,...,A n), (A∗
1,...,
A∗
n) ∈ Domain(F), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if p ∈ A∗
i]t h e n
[p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) i fa n do n l yi fp ∈ F(A∗
1,...,A ∗
n)].
Of these requirements, the ﬁrst one ensures that F always produces a decision
(provided individuals are fully rational), and the second one ensures that the decision
is always fully rational. The third (more controversial) one is analogous to Arrow’s
independence of irrelevant alternatives in preference aggregation, and prescribes pro-
positionwise aggregation/voting: the collective judgment on any given proposition
3An alternative deﬁnition of deductive closure is: A ⊆ X is deductive closed in case A contains
every proposition p ∈ X entailed by some consistent subset of A.P r o p o s i t i o n 1 holds for both
deﬁnitions.
5p ∈ X should be determined solely by the individual judgments on this propositions.
Let me mention three aggregation rules, each deﬁned for all proﬁles (A1,...,A n) in
the universal domain.
• Majority rule: F(A1,...,A n)={p ∈ X : more than half of the persons i have
p ∈ Ai};t h i sr u l es a t i s ﬁes independence, but violates collective rationality for many
agendas, as seen in the introduction.
• Dictatorship by person j: F(A1,...,A n)=Aj, the dictator’s judgment set; this rule
satisﬁes both independence and collective rationality, but is undemocratic.
• Premise-based procedure for the above agenda X = {a,¬a,a → b,¬(a → b),b,¬b}
and an odd group size n: F(A1,...,A n) contains
-a premise p ∈ {a,¬a,a → b,¬(a → b)} i fa n do n l yi fm o r et h a n
half of the persons i have p ∈ Ai (majority voting on premises);
-a conclusion c ∈ {b,¬b} i fa n do n l yi fP |= c,w h e r eP is the
set of premises in F(A1,...,A n) (no vote taken on conclusions!).
Unlike majority rule, this rule generates consistent judgment sets, but it violates
independence because of the decision method used for conclusions.
3 Decision problems and the logics to represent them
I now present several types of judgment aggregation problems, and deﬁne particular
logics (L,|=) that can be used to represent them. As these logics satisfy L1-L5,
judgment aggregation in general logics covers all these aggregation problems. The
reader might be struck by the large variety of diﬀerent logics, and their complexity
compared to the general conditions L1-L5. Judgment aggregation in general logics is
not aﬀected by the complexity of particular logics, as it is based solely the conditions
L1-L3 (plus perhaps L4,L5). So some readers might want to skip the details of the
deﬁnitions of particular logics.
3.1 Decision problems with conjunctions and disjunctions: repres-
entable in standard propositional logic
Standard propositional logic (used so far in judgment aggregation) can represent
decision problems that involve only the logical operators “and”, “or” and “not”. For
example, the supervisory board of a loss-making Western European company might
debate the following propositions:
a : A factory should be closed down.
b : A new factory should be created in Eastern Europe.
a∧b : A factory should be closed down and a new one created in Eastern Europe.
The agenda is thus X = {a,¬a,b,¬b,a∧b,¬(a∧b)}, which belongs to a standard
propositional logic (L,|=) deﬁned as follows.
Standard propositional logic (with ¬,∧,∨). Deﬁne the language L as the
(smallest) set such that (i) L contains each given atomic proposition a,b,...,a n d( i i )
if L contains p and q,t h e nL also contains ¬p (“not p”), (p ∧ q) (“p and q”), and
6(p∨q) (“p or q”). For simplicity, for this and all following logics I often drop brackets
when there is no ambiguity, e.g. I write (a ∧ b ∧ c) → d for ((a ∧ (b ∧ c)) → d).
To deﬁne entailment |= on L,l e ta ninterpretation be a (“truth”) function v :
L → {T,F} that assigns to each proposition a truth value T (“true”) or F (“false”),
such that, for any propositions p,q ∈ L,
(¬) v(¬p)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p)=F,
(∧) v(p ∧ q)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p)=T and v(q)=T,
(∨) v(p ∨ q)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p)=T or v(q)=T.
Each interpretation v stands for “one way the world could be”. By deﬁnition,
A ⊆ L entails p ∈ L (A |= p) if, for every interpretation v such that v(q)=T for
all q ∈ A,w eh a v ev(p)=T.I n f o r m a l l y ,A entails p in case p is true whenever each
q ∈ A is true. For instance, p,q |= p∧q (since v(p)=v(q)=T implies v(p∧q)=T by
(∧)), a |= ¬¬a (since v(a)=T implies v(¬a)=F by (¬), which implies v(¬¬a)=T
by (¬)), a ∧ b |= a (since v(a ∧ b)=T implies v(a)=T by (∧)), etc. Note that
A is consistent (i.e. entails no pair p,¬p ∈ L) if and only there is an interpretation
under which each p ∈ A is true. Informally, A is consistent in case its members can
be simultaneously true. For instance, {¬a,a ∨ b} is consistent (take v(a)=F and
v(b)=T), but {a,¬a} is inconsistent.
3.2 Decision problems with conditional statements: representable
in conditional logics
Now consider aggregation problems involving (bi)conditional statements p → q (“if p
then q”) or p ↔ q (“p if and only if q”), such as the standard examples for judgment
aggregation in the literature. So, let us extend the language by adding the connectives
→ and ↔. L is now deﬁned as the (smallest) set such that (i) L contains each given
atomic proposition a,b,...,a n d( i i )i fL contains p and q,t h e nL also contains ¬p,
(p ∧ q), (p ∨ q), (p → q),a n d(p ↔ q).
How should the entailment relation |= on L be deﬁned? Let me brieﬂyd i s c u s s
three alternative semantics. The ﬁrst one is that of standard propositional logic and
interprets → as a material conditional (problematic); the second one is a simple
modal logic and interprets → as a strict conditional; the third one is a conditional
logic and interprets → as a fully-ﬂeshed subjunctive conditional.
Standard propositional logic (with ¬,∧,∨ and material (bi)conditional →,↔).
For the above language L,d e ﬁne an interpretation as a (truth) function v : L →
{T,F}, assigning a truth value to each proposition, such that„ for any p,q ∈ L,w e
have (¬), (∧), (∨), and
(→material) v(p → q)=T if and only if v(p)=F or v(q)=T;
(↔) v(p ↔ q)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p → q)=T and v(q → p)=T.
So, a → b is declared equivalent to ¬a ∨ b (“not-a or b”). Entailment is deﬁned
as in Section 3.1: A |= p holds if and only if, for every interpretation v such that
v(q)=T for all q ∈ A,w eh a v ev(p)=T.B y ( →material), we have p,p → q |= q
(“modus ponens”); also, ¬p |= p → q and q |= p → q (the “paradoxes of the material
conditional”).
Material conditionals raise well-known problems and misrepresent the intended
meaning of most conditional statements in normal language (e.g. Priest 2001). The
7statement “if it’s the 15th century then people drive cars” is true as a material
conditional because it’s not the 15th century (and also because people drive cars).
This clash between our intuition and the material conditional is due to the fact that,
usually, by “if a then b” one intends a statement not about the actual truth values
of a and b, but about b’s truth value in other (perhaps non-actual) worlds in which a
holds, e.g. worlds where it’s the 15th century. The statement “if it’s the 15th century
then people drive cars” does not mean “either it’s not the 15th century or we drive
cars” (which is true), but it means “in a world of the 15th century, people drive cars”
(which is false).
Also in judgment aggregation, the relevant conditionals are usually not material,
as argued also in Dietrich (2005). For instance, the conditional
a → b :“ if the birth rate is too low then more immigration is needed”
does not mean
¬a ∨ b : “the birth rate is not too low or more immigration is needed”,
but it means “in the case (world) where the birth rate is too low, more immig-
ration is needed”. Under the latter reading, it is perfectly consistent to reject a
without accepting a → b; by contrast, in the above logic (L,|=), ¬a entails a → b by
(→material).
By removing the restriction to standard propositional logic, it becomes possible
to represent conditional statements more adequately. The two logics (L,|=) deﬁned
below are based on possible-worlds semantics, which goes back to Kripke (1963) and
others and is now widely used; for reference, e.g. Priest (2001).
The modal logic S5 (with ¬,∧,∨ and strict (bi)conditional →,↔). I now
endow L with a new entailment relation |=. While for standard propositional logic
an interpretation is given by a single truth function, an S5-interpretation is a pair
(W,(vw)w∈W),w h e r e :
• W is a non-empty set of objects called (possible) worlds;
• (vw)w∈W is a family of (“truth”) functions vw : L → {T,F},a s s i g n i n gt oe a c h
proposition p ∈ L its truth value vw(p) in world w ∈ W, such that, for each world
w ∈ W and any propositions p,q ∈ L, the truth function v = vw satisﬁes (¬), (∧),
(∨), (↔), and
(→strict) vw(p → q)=T i fa n do n l yi fvw0(q)=T for each world w0 ∈ W with
vw0(p)=T,
Condition (→strict)d e ﬁnes strict conditionals: p → q h o l d si naw o r l dj u s ti nc a s e
q holds in every w o r l di nw h i c hp holds. So the truth value of p → q depends not just
on the actual world, but on all worlds in W. Interpretations diﬀer in what worlds
are considered possible, and what propositions are true in them. If the only relevant
aspect of the world is the season, then, not knowing what season it is, all seasons are
possible, say W = {Sp,Su,Au,Wi}; but knowing that it is not winter, only three
seasons are possible, say W = {Sp,Su,Au}. Presumably, in our immigration example
the possible worlds include ones with a bright economic future as well as ones with
long-term economic instability.
By deﬁnition, A ⊆ L entails p ∈ L (A ² p)i nc a s e ,f o re v e r yS5-interpretation
(W,(vw)w∈W) and every world w ∈ W such that vw(q)=T for all q ∈ A,w eh a v e
vw(p)=T.I n f o r m a l l y , A entails p if, whenever each q ∈ A is true, p is true. The
strict conditional still satisﬁes a,a → b |= b (“modus ponens”), but does not satisfy
8¬a |= a → b and b |= a → b (the “paradoxes of the material conditional”). Note
also that A is consistent (i.e. entails no pair p,¬p)i fa n do n l yi fsome world of some
S5-interpretation makes all q ∈ A simultaneously true.
Strict conditionals avoid the two most striking problems of material conditionals,
since neither ¬a nor b entails a → b. In judgment aggregation, it makes a considerable
diﬀerence whether strict or material conditionals are used. To illustrate this, consider
again our immigration example with agenda X = {a,¬a,a → b,¬(a → b),b,¬b},a n d
let us see which judgment sets A ⊆ X are declared fully rational (i.e. consistent and
complete) under the two logics.
• if X belongs to standard propositional logic, the only fully rational judgment
sets are {a,b,a → b}, {¬a,b,a → b}, {¬a,¬b,a → b}, {a,¬b,¬(a → b)};
• if X belongs to the modal logic S5, there are three additional fully rational
judgment sets, namely {a,b,¬(a → b)}, {¬a,b,¬(a → b)}, {¬a,¬b,¬(a → b)}.
Nevertheless, strict conditionals — historically the ﬁrst attempt to formalise non-
material conditionals — face other, more subtle, problems, which suggest that they
do still not fully faithfully represent the intended meaning of many conditional state-
ments. Often, only subjunctive conditionals are considered fully adequate. For, “if
a then b” often means not that b holds in every world where a holds (strict condi-
tional), but that b holds in worlds similar to the actual world except that a is true
(subjunctive conditional). Thus the meaning of “if a then b” is often: if a were true
— if the actual world were modiﬁed so that a becomes true ceteris paribus —t h e nb
would be true. One might even interpret “if a then b” as “in the closest world(s) in
which a holds, b holds”.
Subjunctive conditionals were formalised by D. Lewis (1973) using conditional
logics and have become well-established. Let me introduce a standard version of
conditional logic. It leads to the same fully rational judgment sets as S5 for many
agendas, including the above agenda X = {a,¬a,a → b,¬(a → b),b,¬b}.
The conditional logic C+ (with ¬,∧,∨ and subjunctive (bi)conditional →
,↔). Still for the same language L,aC+-interpretation is deﬁned as a triple
(W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W),w h e r e :
• W is again a non-empty set of (possible) worlds;
• (Rp)p∈L is a family of binary relation on W (wRpw0 is interpreted as “world
w0 is similar to world w,a n dp is true in w0”), such that, for any w,w0 ∈ W and
p ∈ L,( i )i fwRpw0 then vw0(p)=T (an obvious requirement given the interpretation
of wRpw0) and (ii) if vw(p)=T then wRpw (since w is similar to itself);
• (vw)w∈W is a family of (“truth”) functions vw : L → {T,F},a s s i g n i n gt oe a c h
proposition p ∈ L its truth value vw(p) in world w ∈ W, such that, for any w ∈ W
and p,q ∈ L, the truth function v = vw satisﬁes (¬), (∧), (∨), (↔)a n d
(→subjunctive) vw(p → q)=T if and only if vw0(q)=T for each world w0 ∈ W
with wRpw0.
By (→subjunctive), p → q is true in world w just in case q is true in every world
w0 similar to w a n dw i t ht r u ep. This captures the above intuition for subjunctive
conditionals. For instance, “if the earth falls on the sun then we freeze” is plausibly
false in the actual world, because we do not freeze in those worlds similar to the
actual world except that the earth falls on the sun.
9Entailment is deﬁned as for S5, but now relative to C+-interpretations: A ⊆ L
entails p ∈ L (A |= p)i nc a s e ,f o ra n yw o r l dw of any C+-interpretation, if each q ∈ A
is true in w then p is true in w. For instance, like in S5, modus ponens holds but
the paradoxes of the material conditional do not hold. Again, this implies that A is
consistent if and only if for some world of some C+-interpretation each q ∈ A is true.
3.3 Decision problems with modal statements: representable in modal
logics
Modal operators are used to represent phrases in front of propositions such as “it is
desirable that”, “it is ethically required that”, “it is in our interest that”, “it is feasible
that”, “it is probable that”, “it is known that” etc. For instance, “it is desirable that
p” does not say whether p is true or false, but that p is desirable. There are various
ways in which modal operators can be relevant in judgment aggregation. Let me give
two examples.
Non-separable decisions on acts. Many decision problems consist in deciding col-
lective acts. Consider act-describing propositions, such as “income taxes are raised”,
“indirect taxes are raised”, “the budget deﬁcit is reduced”. Certain acts may be
non-separable from certain other acts: whether the former should be taken depends
on whether the latter are taken. To represent this, one may use a modal operator
S standing for “it is desirable that”, and consider an agenda X that contains the
following two types of propositions (and their negations):
• propositions of the form S(p),w h e r ep is an act-describing proposition; S(p)
could be “it is desirable that income taxes are raised”, in short “income taxes should
be raised”;
• conditional statements of the form p → S(q),w h e r ep and q are propositions
describing acts that are not separable from each other; p → S(q) could be “if income
taxes are raised then the budget deﬁcit should be reduced”.
A judgment set A ⊆ X then states that certain acts should (not) be taken,
unconditionally or conditionally on other acts. Note that this approach diﬀers from
the way preference aggregation handles non-separability.
Probabilistic statements. In a private communication, R. Gekker drew my atten-
tion towards the importance of probabilistic statements of the form “it is probable
that p” (in short: “probably p”), where p is a factual proposition such as “carbon di-
oxide emissions are a cause of global warming” or “global warming will continue over
the next 10 years”. If may be interesting to use a modal operator P for “probably”
and to consider an agenda X containing:
• propositions of the form P(p),w h e r ep is a factual proposition; P(p) could be
“Probably carbon dioxide emissions are a cause of global warming”;
• conditional statements of the form p → P(q),w h e r ep and q are factual propos-
itions; p → P(q) could be “if carbon dioxide emissions are a cause of global warming
then probably global warming will continue over the next 10 years”.
A judgment set A ⊆ X expresses probabilistic beliefs about the world. These
probabilistic beliefs are less exact than those expressed in a probability function (how
probable is “probably”?); however, it is more realistic that a person can submit a
judgment set A ⊆ X than a full probability function.
10Of course, each type of modal operator requires a particular semantics, and hence
a particular logic (L,|=). For instance, the above operator S should plausibly satisfy
the entailment S(p),S(q) |= S(p ∧ q) (if p and q are desirable, so is p ∧ q), but the
above operator P should not satisfy P(p),P(q) |= P(p ∧ q) (if p and q are each
probable, p ∧ q need not be probable). While there are many alternative ways to
formalise modal operators, many of them lead to logics satisfying the conditions
L1-L5 of the present model of judgment aggregation. Many formalisations share a
common feature: they are based on possible-worlds semantics, like the formalisation
of conditional statements discussed earlier. The reason is that a modal operator in
front of a proposition p can often be interpreted as stating that p holds in every (or in
some) possible world, under an appropriate notion of possibility: “it is desirable that
p”m e a n s“ p holds in every world respecting our desires”; “it is ethically required that
p”m e a n s“ p holds in every (ethically) permissible world”; “it is in our interest that p”
means “p holds in every world respecting our interests”, etc. (There are exceptions,
notably regarding the operator “it is probable that”; see for instance Gekker 2003).
One may also use a multi-modal logic (with more than one modal operator), or a
logic with a modal operator and a subjunctive conditional →, as might be appropriate
in the two examples above.
Focussing on simple cases, let me brieﬂyd e ﬁne two modal logics, each with a single
modal operator ¤ representing some type of modal necessity such as those mentioned
above. Intuitively, ¤p means that p holds necessarily,i . e . in every possible world,
where a world is possible if it respects desires, or interests, or morality, or budget
constraints, or is compatible with our information, etc. So, let the language L now be
the (smallest) set such that (i) L contains each given atomic proposition a,b,...,a n d
(ii) if L contains p and q,t h e nL also contains ¬p, (p∧q), (p∨q),a n d¤p (“necessarily
p”, under the relevant notion of necessity).
How should entailment |= on L be deﬁned? The simplest possible-worlds se-
mantics, appropriate only for some modal operators, is that of the logic S5.T h i s
logic was deﬁned above for a language without operator ¤ but with →,↔;In o w
deﬁne S5 for the present language L.
The modal logic S5 (with ¬,∧,∨ and necessity operator ¤). For the language
L deﬁned above, an S5-interpretation is a pair (W,(vw)w∈W),w h e r e
• W is a non-empty set of (possible) worlds;
• (vw)w∈W is a family of (“truth”) functions vw : L → {T,F},a s s i g n i n gt oe a c h
proposition p ∈ L its truth value vw(p) in world w ∈ W, such that, for each world
w ∈ W and any propositions p,q ∈ L, the truth function v = vw satisﬁes (¬), (∧),
(∨), and
(¤S5) v(¤p)=T i fa n do n l yi fvw0(p)=T for every world w0 ∈ W.
(One can deﬁne a strict conditional p → q by ¤(¬p ∨ q),a n d¦p (“it is possible
that p”) by ¬¤¬p (“it is not necessary that not p”); for instance, if ¤ represents
moral necessity, ¦ represents moral permissibility.)
Again, A ⊆ L entails p ∈ L (A ² p) in case, for every world w of any S5-
interpretation, if each q ∈ A is true in w then p is true in w. For instance, for each
p ∈ L we have ¤p |= p (since if p is true in every world, it is true in the actual world)
and ¤p |= ¦p (since if p is true in every world it is true in some world). Again, it
follows that A is consistent (i.e. entails no pair p,¬p ∈ L)i fa n do n l yi fsome world
11of some S5-interpretation makes all q ∈ A true.
While S5 is the simplest formalisation of a modality, it far from represents all
forms of modality adequately. Assume ¤ stands for “it is desirable that”. Then
the entailment ¤p |= p, which holds in S5, is obviously inappropriate for many p:
“it is desirable that all humans live in harmony” does not entail “all humans live in
harmony”. Similarly, the entailment ¤p |= p is problematic if ¤ is “it is ethically
required that”: being ethically required does not entail being fulﬁlled. What causes
the problem is that S5 interprets ¤p as meaning that p holds in all worlds, rather
in certain worlds. This suggests that one needs a notion of conditional possibility:
relative to a given world w, only certain worlds should be possible. Writing wRw0 if
w0 is a possible world relative to world w, we can then deﬁne ¤p to hold in a world
w in case p holds in every world w0 with wRw0, i.e. in every possible world relative
to w. R establishes a binary relation R on W. But not any binary relation R on W
can represent relative possibility: R has to satisfy certain properties that depend on
t h et y p eo fm o d a l i t yt ob er e p r e s e n t e d .F o rm a n yt y p e so fm o d a l i t y ,o n eo rm o r eo f
the following properties are often imposed on R: reﬂexivity (wRw for all w ∈ W),
symmetry (if wRw0 then w0Rw, for all w,w0 ∈ W), transitivity (if wRw0 and w0Rw00
then wRw00, for all w,w0,w00 ∈ W), and extensibility (for all w ∈ W there is a w0 ∈ W
such that wRw0). For each set S of properties of R, a corresponding modal logic can
be deﬁned, denoted KS after Kripke (1963), one of the founders of possible-words
semantics.
The modal logic KS (with ¬,∧,∨ and necessity operator ¤). For the language
L deﬁned above, a KS-interpretation is a triple (W,R,(vw)w∈W),w h e r e
• W is a non-empty set of (possible) worlds;
• R is a binary relation on W satisfying the conditions in S; R is the relative
possibility relation or accessibility relation, and wRpw0 is interpreted as “relative to
world w,w o r l dw0 is possible”;
• (vw)w∈W is a family of (“truth”) functions vw : L → {T,F},a s s i g n i n gt oe a c h
proposition p ∈ L its truth value vw(p) in world w ∈ W, such that, for any w ∈ W
and p,q ∈ L, the truth function v = vw satisﬁes (¬), (∧), (∨), and
(¤KS) v(¤p)=T i fa n do n l yi fvw0(p)=T for every world w0 ∈ W with wRw0.
So ¤p is true in w in case it is true in those worlds possible relative w.
(Strict conditional → and possibility ¦ can be deﬁned from ¤ as in S5 above.)
Again, A ⊆ L entails p ∈ L (A ² p) in case, for every world w of any KS-
interpretation, if each q ∈ A is true in w then p is true in w. Again, it follows that
A is consistent if and only if some world of some KS-interpretation makes all q ∈ A
true.
Each set S of conditions on the relative possibility relation R generates diﬀerent
properties of entailment |=. For instance, the characteristic property of the reﬂexivity
condition is that ¤p |= p for all p ∈ L (since if p holds in every possible world then, as
the actual world is possible, p holds in the actual world). The characteristic feature
of the extensibility condition is that ¤p |= ¦p,i . e .i fp is necessary then p is possible
(since if p holds in all possible worlds then, as there exists a possible world, it holds
in some possible world).
12It is debatable which set of conditions S is appropriate for the diﬀerent modal
operators. If ¤ represents “it is known that” (i.e. “the available information implies
that”), S should contain the reﬂexivity condition since we want ¤p |= p (if p is known
to be true then p must be true). If ¤ represents “it is desirable that” then S should
not contain the reﬂexivity condition since otherwise we obtain ¤p |= p (a problematic
entailment, as seen above). Similarly, if ¤ represents “it is ethically required that”,
S should not contain the reﬂexivity condition; it is often argued that S should only
contain the extensibility condition, which guarantees that ¤p |= ¦p, in accordance
with the principle “ought implies can”.
As one easily checks, the logics S5 and KS coincide (i.e. have the same entailment
relation |=)i fS contains only the universality condition that wRw0 for all w,w0 ∈ W
(each world is possible relative to each world).
3.4 The formation of collective preferences: representable in a pre-
dicate logic
Suppose that, as in preference aggregation, a group has to establish a collective pref-
erence relation of set of alternatives C = {c1,c 2,...,c k} (k ≥ 2), based on individual
preference relations. Let me present two ways to model this decision problem as an
instance of judgment aggregation in general logics. Following List and Pettit (2004),
I will represent preferences and rationality conditions as propositions of predicate
calculus.
We consider the predicate language given by the set of constants C = {c1,...,c k},
the set of variables V = {v1,v 2,...}, the two binary predicates R (“is at least as
good as”) and = (“is equal to”), and the standard operators ¬ (“not”), ∧ (“and”),
∨ (“or”), → (“if-then”) and ∀ (“for all”). Formally, the atomic propositions are the
expressions xRy and x = y,w h e r ex,y ∈ C ∪ V ,a n dt h es e to fall propositions, L,
is deﬁned as the (smallest) set such that (i) L contains each atomic proposition and
(ii) if L contains p and q then L also contains ¬p, (p∧q), (p∨q), (p → q),a n d(∀v)p
for each variable v ∈ V . Then:
(i) Each preference relation º on C can be represented as a set of propositions
Aº := {cRc0 : c,c0 ∈ C and c º c0} ∪ {¬cRc0 : c,c0 ∈ C and c ² c0} ⊆ L,
reﬂecting all pairwise rankings under º.
(ii) Any rationality condition on preferences can be expressed as a proposition
in L; for instance, the completeness condition is ∀v1∀v2(v1Rv2 ∨ v2Rv1),a n dt h e
transitivity condition is ∀v1∀v2∀v3((v1Rv2 ∧ v2Rv3) → v1Rv3).L e tR ⊆ L be some
set, interpreted as the set of desirable rationality conditions, for instance those of
a weak order, or those of a linear order, or those of an acyclic and reﬂexive partial
order.
(iii) The exclusiveness of the options can be expressed by the proposition ∧1≤j<j0≤k¬(cj =
cj0) (stating that c1,...,c k are pairwise distinct), and the exhaustiveness of the op-
tions can be expressed by the proposition ∀v1(∨1≤j≤kv1 = cj) (stating that there
are no options except c1,...,c k); here, “∧1≤j<j0≤k”a n d“ ∨1≤j≤k” are shorthands, e.g.
“∨1≤j≤kv1 = cj” stands for v1 = c1 ∨ ... ∨ v1 = ck.L e t E be the set of these two
conditions.
13Exogenous rationality conditions.A s s u m e ﬁrst that, as in standard preference
aggregation, the rationality conditions in R are exogenously imposed, i.e. not sub-
ject to a decision. Then the agenda should be deﬁned as the set X := XC :=
{cRc0,¬cRc0 : c,c0 ∈ C}. To make the rationality conditions and the exclusiveness
and exhaustiveness conditions true by deﬁnition, let me turn them into axioms of the
logic. Speciﬁcally, I consider the set of axioms A = R∪E, containing the rationality,
exclusiveness and exhaustiveness conditions, and I deﬁne a preference logic by the
language is L together with the entailment relation given by:
A ² p i fa n do n l yi f
A ∪ A logically entails p in the
standard sense of predicate logic.4 (1)
In this logic, a set A ⊆ L is consistent (i.e. entails no pair p,¬p ∈ L)i fa n do n l yi fA∪A
is consistent in the standard sense of predicate logic. By consequence, the preference-
theoretic notion of rationality translates into the logical notion of consistency:
• Ap r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o nº on C satisﬁes all rationality conditions in R if and only
if the corresponding judgment set Aº (deﬁn e da b o v e )i sc o n s i s t e n t .
Hence, the preference-theoretic problem of deriving rational preferences becomes
the judgment-theoretic problem of deriving consistent judgments.
Endogenous rationality conditions. Judgment aggregation also allows one to study
the interesting decision problem, in which the (amount and type of) collective ration-
ality is itself subject to a decision. To this end, let us augment the agenda by the
rationality conditions, i.e. let us consider the agenda X := XC,R = {cRc0,¬cRc0 :
c,c0 ∈ C}∪{r,¬r : r ∈ R}. Rather than building the rationality conditions as axioms
into the logic, I now consider the smaller set of axioms A := E, containing only the
exclusiveness and exhaustiveness axioms, and deﬁne the logic as the language L en-
dowed with the entailment relation |= deﬁned by (1) using now the new set of axioms
A.5
4 A ni m p o s s i b i l i t yt h e o r e mi ng e n e r a ll o g i c s
After having given multiple examples of particular logics to represent particular de-
cision problems, we are now back to full generality. Let (L,|=) be any logic of type
L1-L3. I prove an impossibility theorem, generalising earlier results to general lo-
gics. The theorem is the ﬁrst one to apply to the standard examples of judgment
aggregation under an adequate representation of conditional statements.
4Entailment in predicate logic is deﬁned in most standard logic textbooks, e.g. Mendelssohn 1979
5There is an additional subtlety. Intuitively, it is perfectly consistent to reject, say, the complete-
ness condition while holding a complete preference relation by pure coincidence. Indeed, rejecting
the completeness condition is not claiming that preferences must be incomplete, but that they may
be incomplete. However, assume a person holds a complete preference relation º.A s o n e c a n
check, the corresponding set of ranking judgments Cº logically entails the completeness condition,
i.e. Cº |= ∀v1∀v2(¬v1Rv2 → v2Rv1); so, if the person holds a fully rational judgment set A ⊆ X,
where Cº ⊆ A,t h e nA must contain the completeness condition by deductive closure. Similar re-
marks apply to all rationality conditions. To make it possible to reject a rationality condition even
if it happens to be satisﬁed by the actual preferences, one could add a modal necessity operator ¤
in front of each rationality condition — which requires using a modal predicate logic instead.
14By contrast to Arrow’s Theorem in preference aggregation, here an independence
condition on aggregation rules as deﬁned earlier (together with other mild conditions)
does not generally lead into dictatorship; it does so only under rather demanding
agenda assumptions. This is why many impossibility theorems (including ones by
List and Pettit’s 2002, Pauly and van Hees 2004 and Nehring and Puppe 2004) are
based on a more demanding condition than independence, namely on:
Systematicity. For any propositions p,p∗ ∈ X and proﬁles (A1,...,A n), (A∗
1,...,
A∗
n) ∈ Domain(F), if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai i fa n do n l yi fp∗ ∈ A∗
i]t h e n
[p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) i fa n do n l yi fp∗ ∈ F(A∗
1,...,A ∗
n)].
Taking p = p∗ yields exactly the independence condition. Systematicity is equi-
valent to the existence of a function M : {0,1}n → {0,1} (the “universal de-
cision method”) such that, for every proposition p ∈ X and proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈
Domain(F), F(A1,...,A n)(p)=M(A1(p),...,A n(p)). Here, for any A ⊆ X, A(p)
is deﬁned as 1 if p ∈ A and as 0 if p/ ∈ A. Systematic rules include majority rule
(M(t1,...,t n)=1i fa n do n l yi ft1 + ... + tn >n / 2), unanimity rule (M(t1,...,t n)=1
if and only if t1 = ... = tn =1 ), dictatorial rules (M(t1,...,t n)=tj,w h e r ej is the
dictator), inverse dictatorial rules (M(t1,...,t n)=1− tj,w h e r ej is the inverse dic-
tator), oligarchic rules, inverse oligarchic rules, etc. Systematicity is the conjunction
of independence and a neutrality condition: collective judgments should be made by
an independent vote on each proposition (as F(A1,...,A n)(p) depends exclusively on
A1(p),...,A n(p)), where each proposition is treated the same (as M does not depend
on p).
For the below result to hold in general logics, the agenda X s h o u l dn o tb er e q u i r e d
to contain particular propositions (that could be formed only in certain logics), but
rather to display certain logical relations between its members. It turns out the
following agenda type is appropriate for the theorem (recall that a set Y ⊆ L is
minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent and every proper subset of Y is consistent):
Deﬁnition 2 The agenda X is “weakly connected” if
(i) there is an inconsistent set Y ⊆ X such that {¬p : p ∈ Y } is consistent,
(ii) there is a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X such that |Y | ≥ 3,a n d
(iii) there is a minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X such that (Y \Z) ∪ {¬z : z ∈ Z}
is consistent for some subset Z ⊆ Y of even size.
This deﬁnition is not ad hoc: parts (i) and (ii) are indispensable for the be-
low impossibility to hold6, and part (iii) is only a mild addition7.T h e c l a s s o f
weakly connected agendas includes the agendas of all standard example of judg-
ment aggregation, where conditional statements are modelled either with mater-
ial conditionals (problematic) or with strict or subjunctive conditionals (adequate).
For instance, the agenda X = {a,¬a,b,¬b,a ∧ b,¬(a ∧ b)} is weakly connected
(take Y = {¬a,a ∧ b} in (i) and Y = {a,b,¬(a ∧ b)} in (ii),(iii)); and the agenda
6If (i) is violated, inversely dictatorial rules (deﬁned by F(A1,...,An)=X\Aj for some person j)
satisfy collective rationality. If (ii) is violated, majority rule satisﬁes collective rationality, provided
that n is odd (and X is ﬁnite or L5 holds).
7Without the requirement that Z h a se v e ns i z e ,( i i i )w o u l dh o l df o re v e r ya g e n d aX (take any
minimal inconsistent set Y ⊆ X and any singleton Z ⊆ Y ).
15X = {a,¬a,b,¬b,a → b,¬(a → b)} is weakly connected, whether → is a material
conditional (take Y = {¬(a → b),b} in (ii) and Y = {a,a → b,¬b} in (ii),(iii)) or a
strict/subjunctive conditional (take Y = {a,a → b,¬b} in (i)-(iii)).
Let us call an aggregation rule F regular if it satisﬁes universal domain and
collective rationality (as deﬁned in Section 2.2).
Theorem 1 For a weakly connected agenda X, a regular aggregation rule F is sys-
tematic if and only if it is a dictatorship.
This generalises a theorem by Pauly and van Hees (2004), which in turn genralises
List and Pettit’s (2002) original impossibility theorem. Nehring and Puppe (2004)
prove a related theorem, which actually continues to hold in general logics (of type L1-
L3): under an even weaker agenda assumption (only part (ii) of weak connectedness
is needed), F is systematic and monotone i fa n do n l yi fi ti sd i c t a t o r i a l .
Proof. Several times, I will implicitly use L1-L3 and Proposition 2.L e t X be
weakly connected, and let F be regular. Put N := {1,...,n}.I f F is dictatorial,
F is obviously systematic. Now assume F is systematic. Then there is a set C of
(“winning”) coalitions C ⊆ N such that, for every p ∈ X and every (A1,...,A n) ∈
Domain(F), F(A1,...,A n)={p ∈ X : {i : p ∈ Ai} ∈ C}. For every consistent set
Z ⊆ X, let AZ be some consistent and complete judgment set such that Z ⊆ AZ.
Recall that X contains no doubly-negated propositions (¬¬p) and is a union of pairs
{p,¬p}. For simplicity, for any negated proposition q = ¬p ∈ X,l e t¬q stand for
p rather than ¬¬p.8 (p and ¬¬p are essentially identical in the sense of Proposition
2(f), but only p is contained in X.)
Claim 1. N ∈ C, and, for every coalition C ⊆ N, C ∈ C i fa n do n l yi fN\C/ ∈ C.
The second part of the claim follows from collective rationality together with
universal domain. Now assume N/ ∈ C.L e tY ⊆ X as in part (i) of the deﬁnition of
weakly connected agendas. Then Y ¬ := {¬z : z ∈ Y } is consistent. Let (A1,...,A n)
be the proﬁle for which Ai = AY ¬ for all i ∈ N.A sN/ ∈ C, F(A1,...,A n) contains no
element of Y ¬.S oY ⊆ F(A1,...,A n), violating the consistency of F(A1,...,An).
Claim 2. For any coalitions C,C∗ ⊆ N, if C ∈ C and C ⊆ C∗ then C∗ ∈ C.
Let C,C∗ ⊆ N with C ∈ C and C ⊆ C∗. Assume for contradiction that C∗ / ∈ C.
Then N\C∗ ∈ C.L e t Y be as in part (iii) of the deﬁnition of a weakly connected
agenda. So there exists a subset Z ⊆ Y such that Z has even size and (Y \Z)∪{¬z :
z ∈ Z} is consistent. Let Z ⊆ Y be minimal satisfying these two properties. We have
Z 6= ∅, since otherwise Y would equal (Y \Z)∪{¬z : z ∈ Z}, and hence be consistent.
So, as Z has even size, there are two distinct propositions p,q ∈ Z.S i n c e Y is
minimal inconsistent, (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p} and (Y \{q}) ∪ {¬q} are each consistent. This
and the consistency of (Y \Z)∪{¬z : z ∈ Z} allow us to deﬁne a proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈
Domain(F) as follows. Putting C1 := C∗\C and C2 := N\C∗ (note that {C,C1,C 2}





A(Y \{p})∪{¬p} if i ∈ C
A(Y \Z)∪{¬z:z∈Z} if i ∈ C1
A(Y \{q})∪{¬q} if i ∈ C2.
(2)
8More precisely, when I use the negation symbol ¬ Im e a nam o d i ﬁed negation symbol ∼,
where ∼ p := ¬p if p is unnegated and ∼ p := q if p = ¬q for some q.
16By (2),w eh a v eY \Z ⊆ F(A1,...,A n) as N ∈ C.A l s ob y(2), we have q ∈ F(A1,...,A n)
as C ∈ C,a n dp ∈ F(A1,...,A n) as C2 = N\C∗ ∈ C. In summary, writing Z∗ :=
Z\{p,q},w eh a v e( * )Y \Z∗ ⊆ F(A1,...,A n). First assume C1 / ∈ C.T h e nC ∪ C2 =
N\C1 ∈ C.S o Z∗ ⊆ F(A1,...,A n) by (2), which together with (*) implies Y ⊆
F(A1,...,A n).B u tt h e nF(A1,...,A n) is inconsistent, a contradiction. Hence C1 ∈ C.
So {¬z : z ∈ Z∗} ⊆ F(A1,...,A n) by (2). This together with (*) implies that
(Y \Z∗) ∪ {¬z : z ∈ Z∗} ⊆ F(A1,...,A n).S o (Y \Z∗) ∪ {¬z : z ∈ Z∗} is consistent.
As Z∗ also has even size, the minimality condition in the deﬁnition of Z is violated.
Claim 3. For any coalitions C,C∗ ⊆ N, if C,C∗ ∈ C then C ∩ C∗ ∈ C.
Consider any C,C∗ ∈ C.L e tY ⊆ X be as in part (ii) of the deﬁnition of weakly
connected agendas. As |Y | ≥ 3,t h e r ea r ep a i r w i s ed i s t i n c tp r o p o s i t i o n sp,q,r ∈ Y .
As Y is minimally inconsistent, each of the sets (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p}, (Y \{q}) ∪ {¬q}
and (Y \{r}) ∪ {¬r} is consistent. This allows us to deﬁned a proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈
Domain(F) as follows. Putting C0 := C ∩ C∗, C1 := C∗\C and C2 := N\C∗ (note





A(Y \{p})∪{¬p} if i ∈ C0
A(Y \{r})∪{¬r} if i ∈ C1
A(Y \{q})∪{¬q} if i ∈ C2.
(3)
By (3),Y\{p,q,r} ⊆ F(A1,...,A n) as N ∈ C.A g a i nb y(3),w eh a v eq ∈ F(A1,...,A n)
as C0∪C1 = C∗ ∈ C.A sC ∈ C and C ⊆ C0∪C2,w eh a v eC0∪C2 ∈ C by claim 2. So,
by (3),r∈ F(A1,...,A n).I ns u m m a r y ,Y \{p} ⊆ F(A1,...,A n). As Y is inconsistent,
p/ ∈ F(A1,...,A n), and hence ¬p ∈ F(A1,...,A n). So, by (3), C0 ∈ C.
Claim 4. There is a dictator.
Consider the intersection of all winning coalitions, e C := ∩C∈CC. By claim 3, e C ∈
C.S oe C 6= ∅, as by claim 1 ∅ / ∈ C. Hence there is a j ∈ e C.As j belongs to every winning
coalition C ∈ C, j is a dictator: indeed, for each proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F)
and each p ∈ X,i fp ∈ Aj then {i : p ∈ Ai} ∈ C,s ot h a tp ∈ F(A1,...,A n);a n di f
p/ ∈ Ai then ¬p ∈ Ai,s ot h a t{i : ¬p ∈ Ai} ∈ C,i m p l y i n g¬p ∈ F(A1,...,A n),a n d
hence p/ ∈ F(A1,...,An). ¥
As an application, consider the agendas introduced in Section 3.4 to represent
a preference aggregation problem with set of options C = {c1,...,c k} and set of
desirable rationality conditions R. I have distinguished between the agenda XC :=
{cRc0,¬cRc0 : c,c0 ∈ C}, where the rationality conditions are exogenously given (as
in standard preference aggregation), and the agenda XC,R := {cRc0,¬cRc0 : c,c0 ∈
C}∪{r,¬r : r ∈ R}, where the rationality conditions are endogenous, i.e. also under
decision (the logic (L,|=) of each agenda is also deﬁned in Section 3.4). For instance,
suppose that R is the set of conditions deﬁning a weak order or al i n e a ro r d e r :
R = {r1,r 2} (weak order) or R = {r1,r 2,r 3} (linear order), where
r1 is ∀v1∀v2(v1Rv2 ∨ v2Rv1) (completeness),
r2 is ∀v1∀v2∀v3((v1Rv2 ∧ v2Rv3) → v1Rv3) (transitivity),
r3 is ∀v1∀v2((v1Rv2 ∧ v2Rv1) → v1 = v2) (asymmetry).
(4)
Then, if C contains more than two options, the agenda XC is weakly connected:
take Y = {¬c1Rc1} in (i), and Y = {c1Rc2,c 2Rc3,¬c1Rc3} in (ii)-(iii). Inter-
estingly, the agenda XC,R is weakly connected even for two options: take Y =
17{¬c1Rc2,¬c2Rc1,∀v1∀v2(v1Rv2∨v2Rv1)} in (i)-(iii). So Theorem 1 has the following
implication.
Corollary 1 Let the set of rationality conditions R satisfy (4).
(a) (exogenous rationality) If there are |C| ≥ 3 options, a regular aggregation rule
for the agenda XC is systematic if and only if it is a dictatorship.
(b) (endogenous rationality) If there are |C| ≥ 2 options, a regular aggregation
rule for the agenda XC,R is systematic if and only if it is a dictatorship.
Part (a) is not much surprise in the light of Arrow’s theorem (see also theorems
by List and Pettit 2004 and Nehring 2003).9 Part (b) shows that endogenising the
rationality conditions does not help overcoming the impossibility: on the contrary, it
extends the impossibility to the case of only two options.
5 Why judgment aggregation in general logics works
I now state what I take to be the basic technical tools in order to easily derive
judgment aggregation results in general logics. Many past results are essentially
based on these tools, and so they continue to hold in general logics. In Section 5.1,
I focus on the framework L1-L3 and argue that it is appropriate if the only relevant
rationality conditions are consistency and completeness. In Section 5.2, I discuss the
slightly less general framework L1-L4, and argue that it may become relevant when
the rationality condition of deductive closure is analysed.
5.1 Judgment aggregation in L1-L3: rationality as completeness and
consistency
Suppose that the only rationality criteria of interest are completeness and consistency
(and weak consistency), whose conjunction deﬁnes full rationality.T h u st h er e m a i n -
ing rationality condition, deductive closure, is not considered. The reason may be
either that one considers only fully rational judgment sets, which are automatically
deductively closed (see Proposition 1), or that one is simply not interested in deduct-
ive closure, whether or not all judgment sets are fully rational. Under this premise,
the results that one may want to derive — such as results on the (im)possibility of
fully rational aggregation or characterisations of consistent aggregation — can usually
be based on a general logic of type L1-L3 (plus perhaps L5); L4 plays no role and
need not be assumed.
Let me justify this claim. Such results appeal to the inconsistency notion but not
to the underlying entailment relation: they depend only on properties of the system
I (⊆ P(L)) of inconsistent sets, regardless of the particular entailment relation |=
that generates these inconsistent sets. What properties of inconsistency do the res-
ults depend on? The properties listed in Proposition 2 turn out to allow one to prove
many results, such as Theorem 1 above, Nehring and Puppe’s (2004) characterisa-
tion of consistent voting by committees, Dietrich and List’s (2004) liberal paradox for
judgment aggregation, and Dietrich and List’s (2005) characterisation of consistent
9While Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives is weaker than our systematicity, his im-
possibility theorem also requires a Pareto condition.
18quota rules. So, as Proposition 2 requires only L1-L3 (plus perhaps L5), all of these
results are valid in general logics of type L1-L3 (plus perhaps L5 if the agenda X
is inﬁnite). Condition L4 would not add anything: while L1-L3 guarantee essential
properties of the system of inconsistent sets I,L 4i m p l i e sno additional property of
I.10 (One may alternatively take inconsistency as a primitive notion, i.e. deﬁne a
logic not as a pair (L,|=) but as a pair (L,I), at the expense of loosing the notion of
entailment and hence the rationality condition of deductive closure.11)
Proposition 2 (properties of inconsistency) Assume L1-L3. For any A ⊆ L and
p ∈ L,
(a) if p,¬p ∈ A then A is inconsistent;
(b) if A is inconsistent then so is any superset of A;
(c) if A is consistent then so is any subset of A;
(d) if A is consistent then A ∪ {p} or A ∪ {¬p} is consistent;
(e) for every consistent judgment set B ⊆ X, there is a fully rational judgment
set C ⊆ X with B ⊆ C;
(f) A is consistent if and only if A∗ is consistent, for any set A∗ arising from A
by replacing elements q ∈ A by one or more q-variants;12
(g) every ﬁnite inconsistent set has a minimal inconsistent subset;
(h) given L5, every inconsistent set has a ﬁnite minimal inconsistent subset.
The experienced reader will have noticed that these properties are indeed the basic
tools underlying many proofs in judgment aggregation.13 By part (f), any double-
negated proposition ¬¬p is essentially identical to p with respect to inconsistencies:
both stand in exactly the same inconsistency relations with other propositions.
Proof.( a )I fp,¬p ∈ A then by L1-L2 A |= p and A |= ¬p;s oA is inconsistent.
(b), (c): These claims follow from L2.
(d) If A is consistent, then by L3 A has a consistent superset C ⊆ L containing
a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ L.A sC is a superset of either A ∪ {p} or A ∪ {¬p},
either of the latter sets is consistent by (c).
(e) Let B ⊆ X be a consistent judgment set. By L3 B has a consistent superset
D ⊆ L containing a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ L. So the judgment set C := D∩X
is complete and by (c) consistent, and it satisﬁes B ⊆ C.
10The assumptions L1-L4 on |= have exactly the same implication for the system of inconsistent
sets I as the weaker assumptions L1-L3: I will be of the type I1-I3 (see footnote 11).
11One then needs to impose the following conditions on (L,I):( I 1 ) f o r e a c h p ∈ L, we have
{p,¬p} ∈ I;( I 2 )f o ra l lA,B ⊆ L,i fA ∈ I and A ⊆ B then B ∈ I;( I 3 )∅ / ∈ I, and every A ⊆ L
with A/ ∈ I has a superset B ⊆ L with B/ ∈ I containing a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ L.T h e
conditions I1-I3 on (L,I) are equivalent to the conditions L1-L3 on (L,|=): for any language L 6= ∅,
as y s t e mI (⊆ P(L))s a t i s ﬁes I1-I3 if and only if it is the set of inconsistent sets generated by some
entailment relation |= satisfying L1-L3 (if we even require L1-L4, |= is unique and given by [A |= p if
and only if A ∪ {¬p} ∈ I]). While inconsistency can be deﬁned in terms of entailment, the converse
is impossible (without assuming L4): starting from (L,I), one cannot deﬁne |= (without assuming
L4), and hence deductive closure is undeﬁnable.
12q
∗ is called a q-variant (and q a q
∗-variant) if one of q and q
∗ is a k-fold negation of the other
for some even number k ∈ {0,2,4,...}. For instance, q and ¬¬q are q-variants.
13For instance, to show that an aggregation rule F violates collective rationality, it is by (a) and
(b) suﬃcient to construct a proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ Domain(F) such that F(A1,...,An) contains some
pair p,¬p or has some inconsistent subset; each person i’s (fully rational) judgment set Ai can often
be constructed using (e).
19(f) Let A∗ be as speciﬁed. I show that any set S ⊆ L is consistent if and only if
the set e S := {q ∈ L : q is a variant of some r ∈ S} is consistent. This implies the
claim, since e A = f A∗. So, consider any S ⊆ L.I fe S is consistent, then so is S by S ⊆ e S
and (c). Now let S be consistent. Then, by L3, S has a consistent superset T ⊆ L
containing a member of each pair q,¬q ∈ L.Is h o wt h a te S ⊆ T, w h i c hb y( c )i m p l i e s
that e S is consistent, as desired. To show e S ⊆ T, I have to prove that, for any q ∈ S,
T contains all q-variants, i.e. all q∗ ∈ L such that for some even k ∈ {0,2,4,...} (i)
q∗ is the k-fold negation of q or q is the k-fold negation of q∗. I only show case (i), as
case (ii) can be shown analogously. Of course q ∈ B.B yq ∈ B,w eh a v e¬q/ ∈ B by
(a), and hence ¬¬q ∈ B since B contains one of ¬q,¬¬q. Repeating this argument,
one ﬁnds ¬¬¬¬q ∈ B,t h e n¬¬¬¬¬¬q ∈ B, etc., as claimed.
(g) Let B ⊆ L be any ﬁnite inconsistent set. Among all inconsistent subsets of B,
choose a minimal one (with respect to inclusion); there exists one since B is ﬁnite.
This set is minimal inconsistent.
(h) Any inconsistent set has by L5 a ﬁnite inconsistent subset, and hence by (g)
a ﬁnite minimal inconsistent subset. ¥
5.2 Judgment aggregation in L1-L4: analysing deductive closure
In addition to completeness and consistency, it may be interesting to analyse the
rationality condition of deductive closure; this analysis may require the additional as-
sumption of L4 (non-paraconsistency). One motivation for studying deductive closure
can be derived from the various impossibility theorems. Let me explain how. These
theorems tell us that fully rational aggregation is often unrealistic. But if collective
judgments cannot be fully rational, what weaker form of rationality should one aim
at? There are (at least) two approaches:
• Relaxing completeness, but keeping consistency and deductive closure. Here,
the collective abstains from a decision on certain pairs p,¬p, but otherwise forms
judgments that are not only logically consistent, but also deductively closed, i.e.
whenever a proposition p ∈ X follows from the collectively accepted propositions, p
is also accepted. It is then interesting to analyse which aggregation rules generate
consistent and deductively closed judgment sets. As seen in Proposition 3 below,
some tools to analyse deductive closure hold for all logics of type L1-L3, but many
others require a logic of type L1-L4. Dietrich and List’s (2005) characterisation of
the class of all consistent and deductively closed quota rules holds in logics of type
L1-L4 (plus L5 if the agenda X is inﬁnite).
• Relaxing consistency to weak consistency, but keeping completeness and deduct-
ive closure. Here, the collective accepts exactly one member of each pair p,¬p,i na
deductively closed but perhaps not consistent way. This form of restricted rationality
exists only in logics violating L4, because, under L1-L4, by keeping completeness,
weak consistency and deductive closure one actually keeps consistency (see Proposi-
tion 1). But the escape route may be an interesting option in logics violating L4, i.e.
in paraconsistent logics with various degrees of consistency. In some real situations,
relaxing consistency may even be the only feasible collective rationality relaxation,
because completeness cannot be given up since a decision on each pair p,¬p ∈ X is
strictly required. Obviously, the analysis of such rationality relaxations should not
impose L4, hence cannot use the tools (d)-(f) in Proposition 3.
20Proposition 3 (properties of entailment) Assume L1-L3. For any A ⊆ L and p ∈ L,
(a) if p ∈ A then A |= p;
(b) if A |= p then A∪{¬p} is inconsistent; in particular, ∅ entails only tautologies;
(c) if A |= p and A is consistent then A ∪ {p} is consistent;
(d) given L4, each inconsistent set entails any proposition;
(e) given L4, A |= p if and only if A ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent.
(f) given L4, A |= p if and only if A∗ |= p∗, for any p-variant p∗ and any set A∗
arising from A by replacing elements q ∈ A by one or more q-variants.12
Under L1-L4 the entailment relation |= can be retrieved from the inconsistency
notion using (e); see also footnote 11. By part (f), under L1-L4 double-negations
“¬¬”h a v en oe ﬀect on entailments.
Proof.( a )f o l l o w sf r o mL 1a n dL 2 .
(b) If A |= p,t h e nA ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent since A ∪ {¬p}| = p by L2 and
A ∪ {¬p}| = ¬p by L1 and L2.
(c) Assume A |= p where A is consistent. By L3, A∪{p} or A∪{¬p} is consistent.
As A ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent by (b), A ∪ {p} is consistent.
(d) For any inconsistent set A ⊆ L and any p ∈ L,b yL 2A∪{¬p} is inconsistent,
and hence by L4 A |= p.
(e) One direction follows from (b), the other one from L4.
(f) Let A∗ and p∗ be as speciﬁed. By (e) and L4, A |= p i fa n do n l yi fA ∪ {¬p}
is inconsistent, and A∗ |= p∗ i fa n do n l yi fA∗ ∪ {¬p∗} is inconsistent. So the claim
follows from Proposition 2(f). ¥
With Propositions 2 and 3 in place, I can now prove Proposition 1 on the relations
between the various rationality conditions on judgment sets.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume L1-L3 and let A ⊆ X be any judgment set.
(a) If A is consistent then it is weakly consistent by Proposition 2(c). Now as-
sume A is deductively closed. Of course, consistency still implies weak consistency.
Conversely, suppose A is not consistent. So A entails each p ∈ X by Proposition 3(d).
Hence, by deductive closure, A = X.S oA is not weakly consistent.
(b) First, let A ⊆ X be fully rational. Then A is complete, and Proposition 2(c)
weakly consistent. To prove deductive closure, consider any p ∈ X such that A |= p.
By A |= p,t h es e tA ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent by Proposition 3(b). First assume p
is not a negated proposition; then p,¬p ∈ X by the deﬁnition of agendas. Since
A is consistent, A 6= A ∪ {¬p}, and hence ¬p/ ∈ A, which implies p ∈ A by A’s
completeness. Now assume p is a negated proposition, say p = ¬q;t h e nq,¬q ∈ X by
the deﬁnition of agendas. Since A ∪ {¬p} = A ∪ {¬¬q} is inconsistent, so is A ∪ {q}
by Proposition 2(f). So, as A is consistent, A 6= A ∪ {q}, and hence q/ ∈ A,w h i c h
implies ¬q = p ∈ A by A’s completeness.
N o wa s s u m ea l s oL 4a n dl e tA be complete, weakly consistent and deductively
closed. Assume for contradiction that A is not fully rational. Then, as A is complete,
it is not consistent. So, by (a) and A’s deductive closure, A is not weakly consistent,
contradiction the assumption. ¥
216 Judgment aggregation in general logics vs. in a speciﬁc
logic
Not all results on judgment aggregation can or should be stated in general logics:
some results require a speciﬁc logic, but this logic need not be standard propositional
logic.
The general logics model is appropriate for results about agendas (decision prob-
lems) that are characterised by certain logical relations (of inconsistency or entail-
ment) between the propositions, regardless of the speciﬁc logic generating these re-
lations or the speciﬁc syntactic form of the propositions. Examples are the weakly
connected agenda of Theorem 1, and, if suitably redeﬁned in the general logics model,
Gärdenfors’ Boolean algebra agenda, Dietrich’s (2004) atomic agenda, and Nehring
and Puppe’s (2004) totally blocked agenda.
By contrast, the restriction to a speciﬁc logic is required for results about agendas
(decision problems) that are characterised by propositions of a particular syntactic
form, available in a particular logic. I give two examples. Dietrich’s (2005) possib-
ility theorem holds for network agendas X, which belong the conditional logic C+
and contain only propositions of the following syntactic forms (and their negations):
atomic propositions a,b,c,...,a n dconnection rules p → q or p ↔ q,w h e r ep and
q are conjunctions a1 ∧ ... ∧ ak of atomic propositions a1,...,a k, k ≥ 1. Pauly and
van Hees’ (2004) Theorem 3 holds for atomically closed agendas X, which belong to
standard propositional logic and contain (i) each atomic proposition a that occurs in
some proposition in X, and (ii) the propositions a ∧b,¬a∧ b,a ∧¬b,¬a∧¬b for any
atomic propositions a,b ∈ X. Network agendas and atomically closed agendas are
not even deﬁnable in a general logic (L,|=).
7C o n c l u s i o n
I have argued that a large variety of collective decision problems can be studied within
judgment aggregation, where each decision problem requires a particular logic that
can express the propositions under consideration. Given the multitude of logics and
their complexity, one might have feared that a separate approach is needed for each
type of decision problem (each logic), and that judgment aggregation looses its unity
and simplicity as a ﬁeld. But, fortunately, it is possible to work and prove results in
a simple and general model not restricted to any particular logic. I have presented
a model of judgment aggregation in general logics, open to any logic satisfying the
minimal conditions L1-L3 (and perhaps L4,L5); this includes standard propositional
logic as well as many modal, conditional, and predicate logics.
Despite of the generality of the conditions, they allow one to derive interesting
results. In order to demonstrate this, I have ﬁrst generalised existing impossibility
theorems about systematic aggregation rules to general logics; and then I have shown
that many tools underlying the typical proofs in judgment aggregation are also avail-
able in general logics. The framework L1-L3 (plus perhaps L5 if the agenda is inﬁnite)
is often appropriate when consistency and completeness are the only rationality con-
ditions under consideration. Condition L4 may become additionally relevant if one
studies the rationality condition of deductive closure.
22I hope to have convinced the reader that working with general logics does not make
judgment aggregation more diﬃcult, but far more general, and more transparent by
removing unnecessary special assumptions.
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